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Abstract 
In the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident, countries like Germany and Japan 
have planned a phase-out of nuclear generation. Carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technology has yet to become a commercially viable technology with little 
prospect of doing so without strong climate policy to spur development. The 
possibility of using renewable power generation from wind and solar as a non-
emitting alternative to replace a nuclear phase-out or failure to deploy CCS 
technology is investigated using scenarios from EMF27 and the POLES model. A 
strong carbon price appears necessary to have significant penetration of 
renewables regardless of alternative generation technologies available, but 
especially if nuclear or CCS are absent from the energy supply system. The 
feasibility of replacing nuclear generation appears possible at realistic costs 
(evaluated as total abatement costs and final user prices to households); however 
for ambitious climate policies, such as a 450 ppm target, CCS could represent a 
critical technology that renewables will not be able to fully replace without 
unbearable economic costs. 
 
Keywords 
nuclear, CCS, phase-out, renewables, climate policy  
2 
1.Introduction 
Low and zero-emission energy technologies suffered substantial growing pains 
over the past decade: Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi disaster destroyed some 
countries’ confidence in nuclear power (but appears to have had little effect on 
others); the hopes for a burgeoning carbon capture and storage (CCS) industry 
have been perpetually on the horizon; wind power increased rapidly but faces grid 
integration problems; yet the cost of PV solar panels has plummeted thanks to 
subsidised production in China and subsidised demand in many OECD countries. 
With all of these factors playing a role in the carbon intensity of our future 
electricity system, can we afford to rely on renewables to cover a potential supply 
gap from significant nuclear phase-out around the world or the prospect of CCS 
technology arriving too late? 
Prior to the nuclear disaster at the Fukushima generating station, people were 
discussing a renaissance of nuclear energy as a clean, affordable, non-emitting 
power source (Joskow and Parsons 2012). However, with the most severe nuclear 
accident since Chernobyl bringing the potential safety hazards of nuclear power 
production to mind, several countries have decided to abandon or delay new 
facilities. Japan, Germany, and Switzerland have all officially confirmed or 
accelerated their plans for a nuclear exit since the Fukushima disaster. Other 
countries, such as the United States, are re-evaluating their existing and proposed 
projects in light of potentially more stringent safety regulations. This is also the 
case for developing countries such as China, South Korea, and India although 
their need for non-emitting electricity is much greater and could override concerns 
about potential safety risks (Buisson and Arsalane 2012). 
The contribution of CCS to future efforts to reduce climate change is uncertain. 
The technology holds immense promise to allow electricity generation to continue 
using fossil fuels, even under a carbon price, while reducing the power sector’s 
contribution to atmospheric GHG concentrations through avoided CO2e emissions 
(Finkenrath 2011). Yet despite the perceived technical benefits of CCS, 
demonstration projects continue to close after several years of operation, often 
citing uneconomic conditions or uncertain policy environments (AEP 2012, 
Pioneer Project 2012). If CCS is not available and society must transition quickly 
away from electricity generation using fossil fuels in order to meet climate targets, 
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then the overall cost of transforming our power system could be much higher; for 
example, to reach the 2005 emission levels by 2050 could be up to 70% greater 
without CCS according to the IEA (2010). 
Renewable electricity generation capacity is increasing rapidly around the world, 
both in OECD and developing countries, but wind and solar represented only 4% 
of total capacity in 2010. As renewable energy technologies are still in the early 
stages of development, increases have been due mainly to aggressive adoption 
policies in a number of countries, such as Germany, China, and United Kingdom. 
Wind (onshore and offshore) and solar (photovoltaic or concentrating solar) are 
often cited as the main technologies when considering electricity generated from 
renewables. Alternatives like biomass can suffer from competition with food 
production, and energy demand may create perverse incentives in some countries 
(Mitchell 2008); this limit to potential surfaces for energy crops, as well as the 
competition for biofuel use, limits the available resources for power production in 
POLES. Renewables like large hydro and geothermal make considerable 
contributions in some countries, the prospects for expansion are relatively limited 
globally. Other possible renewable energy sources like tidal, wave, and small 
hydro are even earlier in the development cycle than wind and solar, and their 
potential for contributing to electricity generation in the next several decades is 
comparatively small. Energy efficiency could also be used to decrease the residual 
demand from the loss of nuclear capacity or a ‘no-CCS’ case, however this paper 
focuses on trying to replace lost supply through other non-emitting sources for a 
relatively steady demand level. 
In this paper we present results from the POLES model for several scenarios 
simulated for the Energy Modelling Forum 27: Global Model Comparison 
(Weyant 2013). Four technology cases are simulated to evaluate what role 
renewables will play while trying to maintain atmospheric carbon budgets of 550 
or 450 ppm CO2e. Technology cases include:  x ‘All Technologies’ – baseline with no technology restrictions; x ‘Nuclear Phase Out’ – no new nuclear capacities are added and existing 
capacities are retired according to vintage; x ‘Without CCS’ – carbon capture and storage is not allowed; and x No new nuclear and no CCS – note this is not an official EMF27 scenario, 
but is in line with the EMF27 carbon targets. 
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In Section 2, the version of the POLES model used for EMF27 is briefly 
described, along with relevant modules for this paper. Section 3 discusses the 
findings, including impacts to the share of renewables if nuclear or CCS 
technologies are removed from the energy mix, carbon prices and abatement 
costs, and final user price effects. Finally, the key conclusions from the study are 
given in Section 4. 
Throughout our discussion, we focus on the long-term to 2050. This time frame 
offers a sufficient length for both CCS and renewable technologies to develop, 
existing nuclear power plants will have largely surpassed their operating lifetimes 
and have been retired, and many climate targets use 2050 when setting future 
emission reductions goals. These factors provide the correct basis when 
considering the impacts from a nuclear phase-out and/or absence of CCS 
technology. The advancement of renewables is evaluated based on the shares of 
wind and solar in the electricity generating mix, the necessary carbon prices and 
abatement costs to achieve the climate targets under each technology case, and the 
final user prices that result from the power mixes. 
2.Relevant features of the POLES 
model 
POLES is a world energy-economy simulation model for the development of 
long-term energy supply and demand scenarios (European Commission 2006, EC 
2012). The POLES model uses a dynamic partial-equilibrium framework, 
specifically designed for the energy sector but also including other GHG emitting 
activities. Macro-economic drivers, such as population and GDP growth, are 
included through exogenous assumptions. The simulation process uses dynamic 
(year-by-year) recursive modelling, with endogenous energy prices and lagged 
adjustments of supply and demand by world region.  
The POLES model has been developed using a hierarchical framework of 
interconnected sub-modules at the international, regional, and national levels. A 
high degree of detail for technological components of the energy system is 
combined with a strong economic consistency through feedbacks on key 
components via relative price changes at the sectoral level driven by international 
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energy prices. Endogenous model parameters are calibrated on the period 2000-
2010 to include observed preferences and actor behaviour in future forecasts. 
The current geographic disaggregation of the model incorporates 57 demand 
regions and 80 supply regions. For each region, POLES articulates four main 
modules: x Final energy demand by sector; x New and renewable energy technologies diffusion; x Conventional energy and electricity transformation system; and x Fossil fuel supply (conventional and non-conventional sources). 
One world market is considered for oil (the “one great pool” concept), while three 
regional markets are identified for gas and coal (Americas, Europe & Africa, and 
Asia), in order to take into account different cost, market, and technical structures.  
The model provides technological change through dynamic processes such as the 
incorporation of two-factor learning curves, which combine the impacts of 
“learning by doing” and “learning by searching”. Price induced mechanisms drive 
technology diffusion under conditions of sectoral demand and inter-technology 
competition based on relative costs and merit orders, and allow for consideration 
of key drivers to future development of new energy technologies. 
The description of wind and solar power in POLES incorporates potential land 
surfaces available for power production based on average wind speed and annual 
solar irradiation. Renewables compete with other technologies to fill a “demand 
gap” created each year due to total generating stock retirement and electricity 
demand evolution. A significant amount of intermittent generation affects how 
electricity systems operate by: requiring more backup power, sometimes spilling 
electricity which cannot be used, extending the transmission system to 
accommodate new generation, or even reorganizing the electricity network in 
order to locally manage supply and demand (local smartgrids). Limits for wind 
and solar power development due to intermittency are included in POLES and are 
interpreted as a proxy for grid integration limits, institutional barriers, and energy 
storage constraints. Model limits include maximum capacities which can be 
installed based on geography (wind speeds), technology (available backup 
capacity), and population (rooftop surfaces), as well as separate modelling of 
network and distributed power capacities. New developments will eventually be 
needed to better represent intermittency, such as a more detailed capacity credit 
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and load factor, explicit link between intermittent generation and energy storage, 
and load curve alteration due to demand management. 
Total nuclear power is the net result of capacity additions from new plants and 
subtractions due to retirement of existing generating stock. Mid-term (next 5-15 
years) capacity additions are calibrated to Enerdata’s Power Plant Tracker 
database, which follows announced, planned, and in-construction power plants. In 
the long-term, new nuclear additions compete with other technologies for market 
share. Nuclear capacity is removed from the system based on plant lifetimes and 
installation date. 
Carbon capture and storage technology offers the possibility to generate electricity 
from fossil fuels, but avoid emitting carbon to the atmosphere. In POLES, gas and 
coal electricity generation using CCS competes with conventional technologies 
when determining new generating capacity. For CCS, a premium is applied to the 
variable costs of conventional technologies to account for capture, transport, and 
sequestration costs; therefore, non-emitting fossil fuel technology will only appear 
in simulations that include a price for carbon emissions. 
3.Overview of the Results 
Mitigation strategies requires both a strong electricity demand and a dramatic 
increase in the share of non-emitting technologies, be it renewables, nuclear 
power, or generation from fossil fuels with CCS. Many studies have underlined 
that the decarbonisation of the power sector is the second-largest potential for 
emission reductions after energy efficiency (Knopf & alii  2010, Edenhofer 2010, 
Krey & Clarke 2011). Implications of different low carbon technologies into the 
economics of low stabilisation have been largely discussed in many papers (van 
Vuuren, D.P. & alii, 2010 ; Knopf & alii  2010).  More recently, the European Union 
displays its intention to play a leading role in decarbonising its power system by 
targeting 20% of its total consumption from renewables by 2020.  
The issue of the role of renewable energy in climate mitigation scenarios is not 
new. It has been addressed before by other papers. Particularly Krey & Clarke 
(2011) have done a synthesis of this issue covering 162 medium to long term 
scenarios, published during 2006-2010 period, from large-scale energy-economic 
and integrated assessment models.  They argued that “there is little precision in 
the linkage between renewable global energy deployment and the stabilisation 
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goal among the scenarios. This is not surprising given the uncertainty about the 
evolution of renewable energy technologies, the competitiveness of other options 
for reducing CO2 emissions and uncertainty drivers of energy demand”. They 
underline that scenario research could provide more information to unpack this 
uncertainty. 
In fact, last years many progresses have been done on technology performances of 
renewable technologies, including investment costs. We considered that the 
update of TECHPOLES database, the improvements in modelling of the 
renewable energies into the POLES model, and new EMF27 mitigation scenarios 
which reflects new developments, provide a good reason to handle the question of 
the role of the renewable energies into the new context. That’s why in this section 
we analyse the role of renewables in selected EMF27 climate mitigation 
scenarios, in terms of their share of power generation, carbon prices and 
abatement costs, and final user prices. 
3.1. Share of renewables in power 
generation 
Renewables contribute around 20% of world electricity generation today, but their 
role is expected to expand significantly. Hydropower is currently the principal 
renewable energy source, representing 85% of total renewable production. While 
hydropower continues to expand slightly in absolute terms across most baseline 
scenarios, its share in total renewable electricity production decreases to around 
20% by the end of the outlook period (Fig. 1). Currently biomass plays a much 
less important role in the electricity generation than in final consuming sectors; 
however, its market share should remain stable to 2100 at the current 6% of total 
renewable electricity.  
Wind and solar power deployment is becoming increasingly widespread, and their 
role becomes very prominent in some scenarios; for example, representing up to 
53% of total power generation by 2100 in the 450 Nuclear Phase Out scenario.  
Fig. 1 Electricity generation shares in baseline, 550 ppm, and 450 ppm scenarios: 
CCS scenarios are not shown for the baseline case since CCS technology is not 
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applied in POLES without a carbon value; the ‘No nuclear and No CCS’ scenario 
could not be adequately modelled for the 450 ppm case. 
Wind and solar PV are considered intermittent production technologies since they 
are dependent on the local weather, which makes electricity output and timing of 
production more variable and less predictable. For this reason, the scenarios 
implement an upper limit to the share of solar and wind supply in the electricity 
sector. Intermittent renewable electricity reaches around 19% of total electricity 
generation in 2100 under constrained solar and wind power scenarios (Baseline 
‘Constrained Solar and Wind’ and ‘Conventional Energy Focus’). In a scenario 
more favourable to renewable technologies (‘Baseline with Nuclear Phase Out’), 
the contributions of solar and wind are maximized with a combined 39% of total 
generation. These quantities correspond to the boundaries considered by some 
studies as manageable with additional flexibility (Krey & Clarke 2011, Wagner 
2012). 
Carbon pricing is integral to the competitiveness of intermittent renewables. Both 
shares and production levels of renewable electricity are much higher in the 
presence of climate policies and their role increases continuously under carbon 
taxation. In ‘450 ppm All Tech’, by 2100 wind production is multiplied by a 
factor of five and solar by more than a factor of two when compared to ‘450 ppm 
Constrained Solar and Wind’.  
A strong increase in the share of electricity generation from intermittent 
renewable sources may pose fundamental challenges to electricity systems. When 
the contribution of intermittent sources remains limited, the impacts of renewable 
energy policies on the average production cost and the electricity tariffs are also 
limited. This contributes to a good level of public acceptance that is generally 
observed for this type of technological solution. The large increase of renewables 
resulting from scenarios with strong climate policies brings concerns on how the 
cost of this solution and its associated backup facilities may affect electricity 
prices, and subsequently the competitiveness of large energy consumers or the 
energy budget of households. This has prompted studies and analyses on the 
impacts of an increasing amount of intermittent generation (Dale et al 2004, 
Holttinen 2005). Some of the solutions that have been proposed are additional 
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interconnections (Zvingilaite et al 2008), more storage (Mariyappan et al 2004, 
DeCarolis and Keith 2004), and demand response (Strbac 2008). 
A significant amount of intermittent generation will impact the way electricity 
systems operate, the electricity grid’s reliability, and the requirements for backup 
generation capacities or storage. Unless large integrated regional networks – or 
super-grids – are developed, it will be difficult to take advantage of the potential 
complementarities in the hourly production profiles of intermittent sources. In 
order to manage the irregularity of solar and wind energy production individual 
countries are normally forced to implement "backup" capacities, such as 
combined-cycle gas turbines (i.e. conventional means of electricity production), 
which are easily started, but can induce high levels of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Van der Welle and de Joode (2011) indicate that for the integration of intermittent 
technologies in power systems there is a wide range of different technical and 
institutional options available and propose some response options per segment of 
the electricity system. Examples include technical options in generation (e.g. 
large-scale energy storage), metering for demand response, and time-dependent 
pricing for networks and markets. 
Currently in the POLES model, capacity limits for intermittent technologies are 
simulated primarily through available backup capacities (thermal and 
hydropower).  Electricity storage and integrated regional networks will be taken 
into account in upcoming model developments. The long term production cost of 
electricity is thus impacted by continuous changes in four main determinants: 
s shares of the different power plant categories (intermittent renewables, 
thermal, nuclear and hydro) 
s investments costs by category, according to technology improvement and 
learning-by-doing effects 
s average annual production costs by category, including changes in capacity 
factors (especially for backup options) 
s carbon cost for fossil thermal power plants, with or without CCS 
 
If new nuclear capacity cannot be installed for political or social reasons and a 
global phase-out occurs, a sizeable portion of non-emitting electricity production 
will need to be replaced. This situation could occur by country, as for Germany 
and Japan, or it could occur globally more generally. While it may be less likely 
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that a global moratorium on new nuclear capacity will develop, we use the 
EMF27 ‘no nuclear’ scenarios to evaluate the maximum effect a global nuclear 
exit would have. In these scenarios, no new nuclear capacity is added and existing 
plants are retired according to their installation date and lifetimes. For the 
‘Baseline with Nuclear Phase Out’ case, the complete exit from nuclear power is 
reached around 2060, with less than 10% of the current capacity remaining in 
2050. Without a price on carbon emissions, there is very little augmentation in the 
shares of electricity produced from wind and solar due to a progressive exit from 
nuclear power.1 Globally, nuclear capacity stands at 380 GW in 2010 and 
generates approximately 13% of electricity. In the baseline, nuclear capacity is 
940 GW in 2050 and generates over 11% of electricity, but as there is no price 
driver for low-emission technologies in the baseline fossil fuels fill almost this 
entire gap when nuclear is removed as a power option. In 2050, compared to the 
‘with nuclear’ case wind capacity increases by 1.5% of total energy, while solar 
does not increase its shares in a meaningful way.  
The ‘All Technologies’ scenarios have significant quantities of both nuclear and 
CCS generated electricity. 2 Shares of electricity production are similar in the 550 
and 450 ppm baselines, in 2050: wind (17%), solar (16%), nuclear (18%), CCS 
(44-45%). When nuclear is removed, to replace its portion of total electricity 
production, primarily CCS, wind, and solar increase their shares as opposed to 
other generation technologies (Fig. 2). Most of the gap is filled by a rapid 
augmentation of CCS (especially fossil fuel-equipped CCS), which grows to 
supply an additional 11-13% of total electricity (+4.7 to 5.7 GWh). Wind and 
solar production each grow modestly by 1-2% (+0.4 to 0.9 GWh). 
Fig. 2 Change in world electricity production by technology 
CCS technology is not yet viable at the commercial scale and there are many cost 
and technical unknowns when considering a scale-up, but it offers great promise 
to help adapt our current fossil fuel based electricity system to a carbon price. To 
evaluate the complete unavailability of CCS for power generation, we use the 
                                                 
1 Without a carbon price, CCS does not develop in POLES; therefore, we do not consider a ‘no 
CCS’ case associated with a baseline (not carbon constrained) scenario. 
2 For the EMF27 standard carbon constrained scenarios (550 ppm and 450 ppm), which are 
presented in this paper, a global carbon market is used with a single carbon price. 
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EMF27 ‘no CCS’ scenario where carbon capture and storage never becomes a 
viable technology. 
To replace the very large portion of total electricity production supplied by CCS, 
nuclear and renewables generally fill the gap (Fig. 2). Nuclear in particular grows 
to supply an additional 26-30% of total electricity production in 2050 (+10 to 14 
GWh). Wind and solar production is relatively stable, remaining within ±5%.3 By 
2100, with the existing installed nuclear capacity and a 21% reduction in 
electricity demand, wind power is generally “crowded out” from the production it 
provided in the ‘baseline’ case and actually decreasing from what it would have 
supplied without the carbon taxation. 
3.2. Carbon prices and abatement 
costs 
Renewables and energy efficiency will have to play key roles if nuclear or CCS 
are unavailable for the de-carbonization of the energy system. However, a lack of 
non/low-emitting technologies in the investment portfolio drives up the marginal 
abatement cost required to satisfy a global GHG target and despite a technological 
analysis of the feasibility of alternative options, an economic assessment is also 
necessary to understand the economic viability of these solutions (Table 1). 
In the ‘All Technologies’ case, to satisfy a carbon limit of 550 ppm, the marginal 
abatement cost calculated by the POLES model reaches 260 $/tCO2e in 2100; to 
satisfy a 450 ppm target, the marginal cost is far higher even allowing for all 
technology choice.4 Assuming a global nuclear phasing-out policy, the carbon 
price is comparable to the ‘all technologies’ case for both the 550 ppm and 450 
ppm scenarios.  
The absence of CCS in the electricity portfolio appears much more critical in cost 
terms, even for a scenario with a 550 ppm CO2e limit. In 2050, the calculated 
carbon prices to be compatible with carbon objectives are 3-5 times higher than 
the ‘all technologies’ case. By 2100, the costs rise very steeply to impractical 
levels. The carbon price by the end of this scenario must be high enough to 
                                                 
3 Despite an overall decrease in the ‘no CCS’ case of electricity production from wind relative to 
the baseline, wind still maintains or increases its market share of total electricity produced. 
4 All prices included in this analysis are provided in constant 2005 USD. 
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essentially remove all carbon from the power sector and is no longer really acting 
as a tax, but as a ban. 
CCS technology offers the particular advantage of negative emissions when trying 
to meet atmospheric CO2e concentration targets. When combined with biomass, 
CCS can effectively extract carbon from the atmosphere and sequester it 
underground. Considering that our global CO2e concentration has already reached 
390 ppm CO2e in 2012, to achieve a 450 ppm goal, or even a 550 ppm target, the 
potential for negative emissions will be extremely useful. If this technology is 
unavailable because of problems with technological scale-up or difficulty finding 
appropriate storage locations, then negative emissions will likely be impossible.5 
A very high carbon price is therefore necessary to compensate for the loss of CCS 
while remaining within the CO2e target limits. Part of this high carbon price is due 
to the lack of available energy storage or grid management technologies, both in 
the POLES scenarios and at commercial scale in today’s industry. Over the very 
long term to 2100, innovations will certainly provide new options which could 
provide more flexibility, so the results included here should be viewed as an upper 
limit if given only today’s technologies. 
Table 1 Carbon prices for various CO2e limits 
$05/tCO2e Baseline 550 ppm 450 ppm 
All Technologies 
2030 0 160 240 
2050 0 260 830 
2100 0 260 1850 
Nuclear Phase Out 
2030 0 180 280 
2050 0 260 800 
2100 0 270 2020 
Without CCS 
2030 0 230 860 
2050 0 870 4130 
2100 0 4100 14000 
Nuclear Phase Out 
and Without CCS 
2030 0 380 n/a 
2050 0 2020 n/a 
2100 0 16900 n/a 
 
                                                 
5 Geo-engineering options could provide methods to collect CO2e from the atmosphere; however 
potential technologies are at a theoretical level of development today. 
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The carbon price multiplied by the necessary mitigation effort to reach a climate 
target (abatement cost) gives a sense of the economic burden that will be felt. As 
indicated in Fig. 3 below, abatement costs remain below 4% of GDP for the ‘All 
Technologies’ and ‘Nuclear Phase Out’ cases, with dramatically higher costs 
associated to the ‘Without CCS’ case; CCS appears as a key technology to 
maintain abatement costs at a manageable level. This high cost is mainly related 
to a lack of guaranteed peak load generating choices if fossil fuel technologies are 
omitted from the energy mix; POLES must use very high carbon prices to drive 
renewables to displace fossil fuels as peak load options. Biomass-combustion 
technologies can only supply a small portion of this need given their limited 
potential.  
These results from the POLES model show that to some extent, nuclear and CCS 
act as substitutes for each other for reaching carbon constrained objectives. It is 
therefore very interesting to study the impact on costs of both technologies being 
unavailable (the electricity system relying much more strongly on renewables or 
energy efficiency measures). Compared to an ‘All Technologies’ case, turning off 
both nuclear and CCS in the model leads to an abatement cost in 2100 of 10.8% 
of total world GDP to reach a 550 ppm concentration target (more than double the 
‘Without CCS’ case). Electricity prices are unrealistically high by the end of the 
simulation causing up to 35% reduction in total demand for electricity. Setting 
aside the extremely high prices, we can focus on the power mix which results 
from a combined nuclear phase-out and unavailability of CCS. In 2100, 
renewables fill the gap through solar (increase of 23% to 36% of total electricity 
production), biomass (10% to 22%), hydro (6% to 12%), and hydrogen fuel cells 
(1.5% to 8%). As with the ‘Without CCS’ case, wind power is crowded out due to 
demand reduction and higher costs relative to the other technologies (wind’s share 
falls from 23% in the ‘All Technologies’ case to 16% in the no nuclear or CCS 
case).  
Fig. 3 Total world abatement costs for various CO2e limits 
We were unable to adequately model the ‘Nuclear phase out and No CCS’ case 
for a 450 ppm concentration target. The extremely high costs associated with this 
scenario make results from POLES using a fixed GDP forecast unrealistic. 
Already in the ‘Without CCS’ case, total abatement costs are at 15% of world 
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GDP. When nuclear power is also unavailable, the abatement costs rise to 
impractical proportions of world GDP, and a true paradigm shift of the energy 
system that moves beyond supply and demand responses would be necessary in 
these circumstances (European Commission 2011). The POLES model, as well as 
most other energy-economy models, does not endogenously account for such a 
total change to the energy and material systems underpinning our economy. 
3.1. Final user prices 
While Governments are increasingly concerning themselves with planning for a 
low-carbon future, they also need to ensure a secure and affordable power system 
for their citizens, especially in rapidly developing economies where access to 
reliable electricity provides significant economic and health benefits (World Bank 
2008). Translating the abatement costs shown above into final user prices can help 
give a sense of the impact available technology options will have on society. 
While different power generation options will have direct climate outcomes, 
electricity prices to consumers will have strong economic impacts. It is important 
to note that POLES is a partial equilibrium model that uses an exogenous GDP 
forecast. As such, prices cannot influence the global economic evolution. 
Therefore, the prices shown in the following sections, especially the very high 
prices for some scenarios, should be considered with this in mind. 
As an example, we consider the evolution of power prices in the residential sector 
in non-OECD countries to see how the different configurations may impact the 
access to electricity in these countries.  
Fig. 4 Average Non-OECD residential electricity prices 
Power prices are forecast to increase during the next decades, with a steep rise 
during the next 15 years (Fig. 4). Indeed with a growing carbon taxation and a 
strongly emitting power mix (mostly relying on coal), non-OECD countries will 
be affected strongly. 
In the ‘All Technologies’ scenario, power prices in the constrained cases increase 
by approximately 50% by 2100 compared to the baseline case. The absence of 
nuclear exacerbates this trend, but it is broadly similar to the ‘all technologies’ 
scenario: a steeper increase in the mid-term due to rising carbon taxation and 
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decreasing prices over the long-term as the power mix decarbonises. The ‘Without 
CCS’ scenario presents a very different forecast; power prices rise from 
0.07 $/kWh in 2010 to 7-9 times that level in the constrained cases by 2100. 
Again, it should be noted that these prices are in the absence of innovative 
technologies to manage peak load power, either through energy storage from 
renewables or grid management to allow better integration of intermittent 
sources.6 In the mid-term, prices remain within the World Bank’s (2008) estimate 
of willingness-to-pay for rural electrification (0.10-0.40 $/kWh), but as prices 
continue to rise connecting the world’s poor in rural areas may be increasingly 
unaffordable and residential electricity prices of this scale could be crippling for 
developing countries over the coming decades. While electricity prices on the 
scale of 0.20-0.30 $/kWh are already observed in some OECD countries, those 
societies have already benefited from decades of access to much cheaper power. 
Many non-OECD countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, are struggling to 
provide basic power services to their citizens. Innovative solutions will need to be 
found for a global climate agreement limiting CO2e emissions that does not 
cripple non-OECD countries’ ability to develop their economies. 
4.Conclusions 
The outlook for using wind and solar power to replace a large nuclear phase-out 
or the absence of CCS technology in the power system appears to be relatively 
limited. If a complete nuclear phase-out is conducted around the world (i.e. no 
new nuclear capacities are added and existing plants are retired according to 
vintage), even a stringent climate target (450 ppm) can still be met since either 
renewables or CCS could replace the lost base load power. However, if CCS is 
unavailable, even a more modest climate target (550 ppm) will be very expensive 
to achieve since there are currently few alternative options for guaranteed peak 
load power other than fossil fuels.  
The current version of the POLES model is limited when considering fundamental 
changes to the electricity generation system, like breakthrough technologies for 
non-emitting peak load generation; with the extremely high electricity prices 
shown in this study as a result. The high carbon prices and electricity costs 
                                                 
6 Residential electricity prices in POLES are primarily set through peak load rates. 
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presented in this paper for the ‘Without CCS’ cases can be seen as an upper limit 
of the costs engendered by a very strong decarbonisation scenario; this finding 
highlights the need for investments in alternatives to fossil fuel peak load power 
options, like grid interconnection improvements, large-scale electricity storage, 
and demand side management. 
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